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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 17-2982
____________
MATTIE M. COOPER,
Appellant
v.
THOMAS JEFFERSON UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(E. D. Pa. No. 2-16-cv-05587)
District Judge: Honorable Timothy J. Savage
____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
April 10, 2018
Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: August 20, 2018)
____________
OPINION*
____________

FISHER, Circuit Judge.

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.

Mattie M. Cooper, an African American registered nurse, was terminated by her
employer, Thomas Jefferson University Hospital, after she allowed her nursing license to
expire. Cooper sued the hospital under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for race discrimination. After
discovery, the District Court entered summary judgment in the hospital’s favor. Cooper
appeals. We will affirm.
I.
In Pennsylvania, individuals employed as registered nurses must be licensed.1
They also must renew their licenses every two years, and all state requirements must be
met before a renewed license can be issued.2 Starting in January 2015, in addition to
requiring a license fee and 30 continuing education units, the Commonwealth began
requiring registered nurses to take a three-hour course in child abuse recognition and
reporting.3
Federal law requires that hospitals accepting federal Medicare and Medicaid funds
ensure that their employees comply with state licensing requirements.4 Accordingly,
Thomas Jefferson University Hospital offered on-site continuing education and issued its
own reminders of license renewal deadlines. The hospital’s Policy 200.04 made the
“employee . . . responsible for completing the necessary procedures for renewal of his/her
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28 Pa. Code § 109.7.
49 Pa. Code § 21.29.
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63 Pa. Stat. § 222; 23 Pa. Stat. § 6383.
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42 C.F.R. § 482.11.
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license.”5 The policy established processes for verifying license renewal and suspending
employees who did not renew in advance of the deadline. It provided a ten-business-day
grace period after expiration, but ultimately prescribed termination for any employee who
failed to renew a required license.
Cooper became a registered nurse in 1981 and began working as a staff nurse at
Jefferson Hospital in 2007. She was due to renew her license on October 31, 2015, as had
been required every two years throughout her career. Although she had paid the fee and
obtained the required continuing education units, her license expired on October 31
because she had not completed the newly-mandatory child abuse class. Cooper continued
to work and completed the class online on November 16; her renewed license was issued
the next day. Also on November 16, human resources manager Kathleen Shannon
recommended that Cooper’s employment be terminated for failing to meet job
requirements by not renewing her nursing license and working without a valid license.
On November 18, Shannon met with Cooper and terminated her.
Cooper argues that her supervisor, Barbara Alpini, engaged in discriminatory
behavior at various times during Cooper’s employment. However, Alpini went on
medical leave on November 16 and did not return for more than a month. Alpini,
therefore, did not make the termination decision—a fact that Cooper does not dispute.
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App. 185-87.
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Cooper filed a grievance, and the hospital sustained the termination. After filing a
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Cooper brought suit
against the hospital in the District Court.
Cooper alleged that she was terminated due to race discrimination—specifically,
Alpini’s personal bias and Alpini’s resentment over Cooper’s complaints that Alpini
made professional decisions based on race. Cooper also contended that the hospital’s
failure to suspend her in accordance with Policy 200.04 evidenced a discriminatory plan
to terminate her employment. Being suspended, she says, would have made it clear to her
that her license had not yet renewed. Having not been suspended, Cooper worked
throughout the first two weeks of November with an expired license. Yet Cooper
admitted that license renewal was her duty.
Following discovery, the District Court granted the hospital’s motion for summary
judgment because Cooper did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Cooper
appeals.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. 6
Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
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S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 256 (3d Cir. 2013).
4

the non-movant, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.7
III.
On appeal, Cooper contends that she established a prima facie case of race
discrimination. She also argues that the hospital did not advance a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her, and that the given reason was pretextual.
A.
Cooper does not present direct evidence that her termination was discriminatory.
Rather, she relies on the well-established McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework
to argue that discrimination may be inferred.8
Under McDonnell Douglas, the employee must make out a prima facie case of
intentional discrimination.9 Whether the employee has done so is a question of law for
the court.10 If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant has a “relatively
light burden” to produce evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
actions.11 The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the given reason was a
pretext for the defendant’s actual discriminatory motive.12 To avoid summary judgment,
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Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
9
Id. at 802.
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Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003).
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Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994).
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McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
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then, Cooper needed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and produce
evidence that would allow a factfinder to reasonably conclude that any nondiscriminatory reasons articulated by the hospital were pretextual.13
In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell
Douglas, the plaintiff must prove that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she
was qualified for the position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the
circumstances could give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.14 Such an
inference may be drawn if the plaintiff identifies “a similarly situated individual outside
of the protected class, who engaged in the same conduct but was treated more
favorably.”15 There is no dispute that Cooper meets the first and third prongs: as an
African-American, she a member of a protected class, and her termination is an adverse
employment action.
A plaintiff is not qualified for a position, as required by the second prong—and
her prima facie case fails—if there is objective evidence she did not possess minimal job
qualifications such as “a license or a similar prerequisite.”16 Cooper says she was
minimally qualified because on the date of her termination, she had a valid license. The
hospital says she was not minimally qualified because before she was terminated, she
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e); see also Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763.
Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 169 (3d Cir. 2013).
15
Id. at 170.
16
Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2008).
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worked for several days without a license. We think it unlikely that an employee who
lacks a required license for some period of time during her employment is minimally
qualified for her position.
We need not resolve the minimal qualifications question, however, because
Cooper’s prima facie case falls short elsewhere. She did not establish the fourth element:
that the circumstances could give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. A
plaintiff may meet this fourth element by presenting evidence that similarly situated
employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably, but Cooper does not
pursue that strategy.17 Instead, she asserts that she should have been suspended under
Policy 200.04, and the fact that she was not suspended, but terminated, could give rise to
an inference of discrimination.
Cooper bases this argument on a step-by-step recounting of the timeline leading up
to her termination. For example, Cooper argues that Alpini should have suspended her
when she failed to renew her license five days before the renewal deadline, as Policy
200.04 provided. Alpini spoke with Cooper at that point, and Cooper told Alpini that she
had renewed her license, offering to produce the receipt for the license fee payment.
Alpini “claims she took Ms. Cooper at her word, despite the fact that the only acceptable
proof of license renewal is the license itself.” Appellant’s Br. 29. Because Alpini took
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Cooper argued in the District Court that a white nurse was allowed to work without a
license in 2009, but her argument was contradicted by the hospital’s records and Alpini’s
testimony. Cooper abandoned the argument on appeal.
7

Cooper at her word, she did not suspend her, but continued to put her on the nursing
schedule. Cooper argues that Alpini should have suspended her.
Cooper argues, in other words, that the facts give rise to an inference of
discrimination because her supervisor gave her the benefit of the doubt and believed her
when she said she had renewed her license. We disagree that supervisory forbearance and
trust give rise to an inference of discrimination. The remainder of the timeline leading to
Cooper’s termination likewise lacks any whiff of discrimination, and therefore similarly
fails to give rise to the required inference.
Cooper also argues that there could be an inference of discrimination because
Alpini made supervisory decisions based on race—something Cooper had complained
about in the past. Cooper admits, however, that Alpini did not terminate her; Alpini was
on leave, and HR manager Kathleen Shannon made the decision.
Therefore, Cooper failed to make out a prima facie case, and the District Court
correctly granted summary judgment.
B.
Because Cooper failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the
District Court did not proceed further with the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting
analysis. However, the record shows that the hospital’s proffered reason for terminating
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Cooper was legitimate, non-discriminatory, and non-pretextual. This is an alternative
ground for affirmance.18
Where the defendant establishes a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for
termination, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove the reason is pretextual.19 To
show pretext, the plaintiff must offer evidence that “(1) casts doubt upon the legitimate
reason proffered by the employer such that a fact-finder could reasonably conclude that
the reason was a fabrication; or (2) would allow the fact-finder to infer that
discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the
employee’s termination.”20
Policy 200.04, the hospital’s cited reason for terminating Cooper, provided for the
termination of any employee who failed to renew a required license within ten business
days of its expiration. Cooper contends this was not a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
because neither state law nor the hospital’s accrediting body required termination. In other
words, Cooper argues that in order to be legitimate and non-discriminatory, Policy 200.04
needed to be embodied in a statute or accreditation requirement. Cooper cites no authority
to support this novel position, which is entirely unpersuasive. Her argument amounts to an
attack on the strength or wisdom of the policy, but we are not an “arbitral board[] ruling on
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Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (“We . . . may affirm the District
Court’s judgment on any basis supported by the record.”).
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Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot.
Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 364 (3d Cir. 2008).
20
C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d at 370.
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the strength of cause for discharge. The question is not whether the employer made the
best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is discrimination.”21
Cooper has not pointed to evidence that would allow a factfinder to reasonably conclude
that the hospital’s articulated reason for termination was a pretext for discrimination.
Cooper argues that Alpini’s asserted bias shows that the reason for termination was
pretextual. As explained, however, Alpini did not terminate Cooper. Therefore, Alpini’s
behavior does not establish that Policy 200.04 was merely a pretext for termination.
IV.
We will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997) (alteration and
internal quotation marks omitted (quoting Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157,
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